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I.  Introduction 
This consolidated appeal considers a bevy of challenges 
brought by the Township of Bordentown, Township of 
Chesterfield, and Pinelands Preservation Alliance’s (“PPA”) 
(collectively, the “petitioners”), seeking to prevent the 
expansion of interstate natural gas pipeline facilities operated 
by the Transcontinental Pipe Line Company, LLC 
(“Transco”).1  The petitioners contend that the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) violated the federal statute 
governing the approval and construction of interstate pipelines, 
as well as other generally applicable federal environmental 
protection statutes, by arbitrarily and capriciously approving 
Transco’s proposed project.  The petitioners further maintain 
that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(“NJDEP”) violated New Jersey law by (1) improperly issuing 
                                              
1 All three petitioners challenge the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection’s actions, Docket No, 
17-3207, but only the Townships challenge the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s orders, Docket No. 17-1047.  For 
convenience, we use “petitioners” interchangeably throughout 
the opinion to refer to both groups. 
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to Transco various permits that Transco was required under 
federal law to obtain before it could commence construction 
activities on the pipeline project, and (2) denying the 
petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the 
permits’ issuance, based only on the NJDEP’s allegedly 
incorrect belief that the New Jersey regulations establishing the 
availability of such hearings were preempted by federal law. 
 
As explained more fully below, although we conclude 
that the petitioners’ challenges to FERC’s orders lack merit, 
we agree that the NJDEP’s interpretation of the relevant federal 
law was incorrect, thus rendering unreasonable the sole basis 
for its denial of the petitioners’ request for a hearing.  Given 
our disposition, we do not reach the petitioners’ substantive 
challenges to the NJDEP’s provision of the permits, which — 
assuming a hearing is granted — we leave for the NJDEP to 
address in the first instance.  We accordingly will deny in part 
and grant in part the petitions for review, and we will remand 
to the NJDEP for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
II.  Background 
This case presents challenges to both the federal and 
state governments’ treatment of Transco’s application to 
construct its interstate pipeline project.  Before detailing the 
agency proceedings that preceded this appeal, we first briefly 
set forth the various interlocking federal and state regulatory 
schemes at play, which this Court has already elucidated in 
some detail.  See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y of Pa. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 870 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“Delaware II”); Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., 833 F.3d 360, 367–69 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“Delaware I”).  
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A.  Statutory Background 
Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (“NGA”), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 717–717z, FERC is tasked with regulating the construction 
and operation of interstate natural gas pipelines.  Id. §§ 717f, 
717n.  If FERC determines that a given project should proceed, 
it will issue a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” 
(the “certificate”), which in turn is conditioned on the pipeline 
operator acquiring other necessary state and federal 
authorizations.  See Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 367–68.  Among 
the regulatory schemes related to the NGA are the federal 
environmental laws, including the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h, and the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.  NEPA 
is primarily a procedural statute that requires FERC to assess 
“the potential environmental impact of a proposed pipeline 
project.”  Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368.  Upon completing the 
analysis, FERC must issue either an Environmental 
Assessment (“EA,” if the analysis indicates that the project will 
have no significant environmental impacts) or an 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS,” if the analysis 
indicates that the project will be a “‘major Federal action’ that 
would ‘significantly affect[] the quality of the human 
environment’”).  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 869 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(C)).  As to the CWA, although the NGA 
explicitly “preempts state environmental regulation of 
interstate natural gas facilities,” it “allows states to participate 
in environmental regulation of these facilities under . . . the 
Clean Water Act.”  Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368.  The CWA 
permits states, subject to United States Environmental 
Protection Agency approval, to establish their own minimum 
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water quality standards, including by regulating the discharge 
of pollutants into bodies of water in the state.  Id.   
 
The NGA and CWA converge where, to construct an 
interstate pipeline, a company must discharge into — or 
displace water from — the navigable waters of the United 
States.  Before a company is permitted to undertake this 
activity, it must obtain a permit pursuant to Section 404 of the 
CWA, which itself may issue only after the company secures a 
state-issued Water Quality Certification, pursuant to Section 
401 of the CWA, “confirm[ing] that a given facility will 
comply with federal discharge limitations and state water 
quality standards.”  Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (“Any 
applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity 
. . . which may result in any discharge into the navigable 
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a 
certification from the State in which the discharge originates or 
will originate, . . . that any such discharge will comply with the 
applicable [water quality] provisions . . . of this Act”).  Because 
New Jersey has assumed permitting authority under Section 
404 — implemented by the NJDEP under the framework of the 
New Jersey Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act (“FWPA”), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:9B-1 — the issuance of a Section 404 
permit in New Jersey carries with it a Section 401 Water 
Quality Certification.  N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-2.1(c)–(d); 
Delaware I, 833 F.3d at 368–69. 
 
B.  Procedural History 
The permits at issue in this case relate to Transco’s 
Garden State Expansion Project (the “Project”), by which 
Transco planned to upgrade its existing interstate natural gas 
pipeline system so that it could support the transportation of 
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another 180,000 dekatherms per day of capacity for natural gas 
from its Mainline to its Trenton–Woodbury Lateral.  The 
Project proposed to construct a new meter and regulating 
station, compressor station, and electric substation along the 
Trenton–Woodbury Lateral in Chesterfield, New Jersey 
(Station 203), and to upgrade and modify the existing motor 
drives and compressor station located on the Mainline in 
Mercer County, New Jersey (Station 205).  
 
The New Jersey Natural Gas company (“NJNG”) 
contracted with Transco to utilize all the capacity added by the 
Project, for distribution via NJNG’s intrastate pipeline 
system.  In anticipation of obtaining the excess capacity, NJNG 
has proposed to construct the Southern Reliability Link Project 
(“SRL”), a 28-mile-long intrastate pipeline that would connect 
to Transco’s Trenton–Woodbury Lateral pipeline and deliver 
gas south-eastward for connection into NJNG’s existing 
system.  Separately, PennEast has proposed to construct the 
interstate PennEast Pipeline Project, which would deliver 
natural gas from Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale region and 
terminate at an interconnect with Transco’s Mainline.  NJNG 
has independently contracted with PennEast to purchase 
180,000 dekatherms per day of the PennEast project’s expected 
supply, for delivery to the SRL via Transco’s pipeline 
network.2   
 
                                              
2 Whereas the SRL — as a purely intrastate pipeline — 
would not be subject to FERC’s jurisdiction or oversight, the 
PennEast pipeline, which will traverse Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, would be.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)–(c). 
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As required by the NGA, Transco sought and obtained 
from FERC a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
authorizing the construction of the Project, subject — as is 
generally the case — to Transco “receiv[ing] all applicable 
authorizations required under federal law.”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 67.  Prior to issuing the certificate, FERC conducted 
an environmental analysis and issued an EA concluding that, 
with the appropriate mitigation measures, the Project would 
have “no significant impact” on the environment.  App. 1479; 
see also App. 45.  FERC issued the EA in November 2015 and, 
after receiving comments, issued Transco the certificate in 
April 2016.  Bordentown and Chesterfield moved FERC for a 
rehearing, which FERC denied in November 2016.  See App. 
74–97. 
 
Because the Project would be situated in freshwater 
wetlands and transition areas, and the construction of the 
Project would require discharging fill or dredge material into 
navigable waters as well as the diversion of a significant 
volume of water, Transco applied to the NJDEP for a 
Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit and Water Quality 
Certificate (“FWW permit”) and dewatering permit, as 
required by the CWA and New Jersey law.3  The NJDEP held 
two days of public hearings to consider the FWW permit, and 
received over 1,800 written comments, which included 
concerns raised by each of the petitioners.  After obtaining 
                                              
3 Transco also applied for and received a Flood Hazard 
Area Individual Permit and Flood Hazard Area Verification, 
but subsequently relinquished the Permit after being able to 
move the Project out of the area subject to it, and the petitioners 
do not challenge the provision of those permits on appeal. 
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Transco’s responses to the public comments, as well as its 
responses to the NJDEP’s requests for additional information 
concerning possible alternative sites for an electrical substation 
that would be built as part of the Project, the NJDEP issued the 
FWW permit on March 13, 2017.  Shortly thereafter — and 
also following a public hearing — the NJDEP on March 16, 
2017 issued the temporary dewatering permit.   
 
Pursuant to New Jersey law, the petitioners sought an 
adjudicatory hearing concerning each permit.  Bordentown — 
later joined by Chesterfield and PPA — filed a request for a 
hearing on the FWW on March 22, 2017.  On April 11, 2017, 
Bordentown alone also requested an adjudicatory hearing on 
the dewatering permit.  Both requests were filed within the 30-
day limitations period established under New Jersey law for 
seeking adjudicatory hearings.  See N.J. Admin. Code §§ 
7:7A-21.1(b); 7:14A-17.2(c).  Bordentown asserted that it had 
standing under state law to challenge the permits as a third 
party because it had a particularized property interest affected 
by the Project, given that part of the project would be built on 
Bordentown-owned land, which Transco had acquired through 
eminent domain under the authority granted by the FERC 
certificate.  See NJDEP App. 37 & n.4; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717f(h).  On August 22, 2017, the NJDEP denied the 
petitioners’ requests for an adjudicatory hearing on either 
permit.  The sole stated basis for the NJDEP’s denial of the 
request was that this Court’s decision in Delaware I established 
that we have “exclusive jurisdiction to review the issuance of 
permits regarding interstate natural gas pipeline projects” and 
accordingly that by operation of the NGA “the state 
administrative hearing process provided for in the [FWPA] is 
not applicable to permits for interstate natural gas 
projects.”  NJDEP App. 39.  Concluding that the NGA 
 12 
 
“requires that final permits be appealed to the Third Circuit,” 
the NJDEP denied the petitioners’ hearing requests.   
 
The petitioners timely sought review in this Court, both 
of FERC’s orders issuing the certificate and denying rehearing, 
and of the NJDEP’s issuance of the permits and its order 
denying the requests for an adjudicatory hearing to challenge 
them.  We have jurisdiction to review these petitions for review 
of the federal and state agencies’ orders regarding the interstate 
Project under 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). 
 
III.  Challenges to FERC’s Orders 
We begin with the challenges directed at FERC’s orders 
(docket No. 17-1047).  As explained more fully below, we 
conclude that the petitioners’ FERC-related claims are 
unavailing. 
 
A.  Interpreting the CWA 
Before turning to the merits of the certificate’s issuance, 
we must address the petitioners’ challenge to its timing.  As 
noted, Transco was required under the CWA to obtain a 
Section 401 permit from the NJDEP affirming that Transco’s 
discharge activities would comply with federal and state water 
quality standards.  Under Section 401, Transco had to obtain 
such a permit prior to the issuance of any “Federal license or 
permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any 
discharge into the navigable waters.”  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a); see 
also id. (“No license or permit shall be granted until the 
certification required by this section has been obtained or has 
been waived . . . .”).  The petitioners argue that, despite this 
clear language, FERC issued the certificate to Transco before 
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Transco obtained the Section 401 permit from New Jersey, 
thereby authorizing the pipeline project that “may result in . . 
.  discharge into the navigable waters” in contravention of § 
1341(a)’s mandate.   
 
FERC does not dispute that Transco had yet to obtain 
the Section 401 permit, but argues instead that it only issued a 
conditional certificate, which required Transco first to obtain 
the required state permits and then to secure FERC’s 
permission to proceed before it could begin any construction 
related to the project.  See App. 67, 89–90.  In FERC’s view, 
because the certificate did not, in fact, permit Transco to 
“conduct any activity” that could “result in any discharge into 
the navigable waters” until Transco had received the necessary 
state permits, FERC’s issuance of the conditional certificate 
prior to Transco’s receipt of the state-issued Section 401 permit 
did not contravene the CWA.4  We agree with FERC’s position 
and hold that FERC’s practice of issuing certificates that 
condition the start of construction on the receipt of the 
necessary state permits complies with the plain language of the 
CWA.5    
 
                                              
4 We note that it is not FERC, but the Environmental 
Protection Agency, that is tasked with administering the CWA, 
so FERC’s views are not entitled to deference.  See, e.g., Scafar 
Contracting, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 325 F.3d 422, 423 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
5 In so holding, we agree with the reasoning of the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Del. 
Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
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As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit explained, “the ‘logically antecedent’ question under § 
401 is whether the disputed federal permit or license ‘is subject 
to the provisions of Section 401(a)(1)’ in the first place.”  Del. 
Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388, 398 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (“DRN II”) (quoting North Carolina v. FERC, 112 F.3d 
1175, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).  Where the conduct that the 
certificate authorizes “would not result in a discharge,” Section 
401(a) is inapposite and no “license or permit” is needed to 
engage in that conduct.  Id.   
 
The petitioners concede that the certificate did not 
permit Transco to engage in any construction — which 
implicitly acknowledges that it did not permit Transco to 
engage in any activity that could result in discharge — but 
argue that the certificate nevertheless “sanctions other conduct 
that Transco would not otherwise be permitted to undertake,” 
such as initiating condemnation actions under the NGA, 15 
U.S.C. § 717f(h).  Pet. Br. 35.  However, the activity that 
FERC’s certificate allows to commence — bringing a 
condemnation action — cannot, without a series of additional 
steps (among them the prohibited construction activities), 
result in the discharge of water.6  Even accepting the 
                                              
6 The petitioners reply that nothing in the CWA “limit[s] 
the scope of covered permits to those [actions] that directly or 
immediately may result in a discharge” and that under the plain 
definition of “result” — meaning “a physical, logical, or legal 
consequence” — the certificate “which authorizes Transco’s 
pipeline, may ‘result’ in a discharge.”  Reply 13–14 (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).  But given the 
express condition that Transco obtain all the required state 
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petitioners’ argument, FERC’s conditional certification does 
not contravene the CWA’s requirements.  The petitioners’ 
argument would expand the CWA from a statute meant to 
safeguard the nation’s water sources to a statute regulating the 
initiation of an interstate pipeline’s construction 
process.  However, the latter statute already exists and, as the 
petitioners themselves note, it provides Transco the 
condemnation authority upon the issuance of the certificate, 
with no caveats.  To the extent that the NGA recognizes the 
continued applicability of the CWA, it is only with respect to 
pipeline-related activities that impact the CWA’s area of 
concern.  The mere ability to initiate condemnation 
proceedings, proceedings regarding land from which discharge 
                                              
permits before obtaining authorization to begin construction — 
which the petitioners do not contest is the only conduct that 
could proximately result in discharge — the certificate alone 
neither “logically” nor “legally” results in the consequence of 
a discharge.  It is black letter law that an independent 
intervening act — here, the state permit and FERC’s 
authorization to commence construction — severs the causal 
chain.  See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 160 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the Supreme Court [has] held that 
an injury [is] not fairly traceable” to an action where the 
“independent act of a third party was a necessary condition of 
the harm’s occurrence, and it was uncertain whether the third 
party would take the required step”), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).  In summary, because 
no discharge-creating activity can commence without New 
Jersey independently awarding Transco with a Section 401 
permit, no activities that may result in a discharge can follow 
as a logical result of just FERC’s issuance of the certificate. 
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into the United States’ navigable waters might not even occur, 
plainly is not an activity that the CWA prohibits prior to 
obtaining a Section 401 permit.  
 
Because, as was the case before the D.C. Circuit, the 
petitioners have “pointed to no activities authorized by the 
conditional certificate itself that may result in such discharge 
prior to the state approval and the Commission’s issuance of a 
Notice to Proceed,” DRN II, 857 F.3d at 399 (quoting 
Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC, 807 F.3d 267, 279 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (Rogers, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the 
judgment)), we conclude that FERC did not violate the CWA 
by issuing the certificate prior to the NJDEP’s issuance of its 
Section 401 permit. 
 
B.  NEPA Challenges 
Turning to the merits of FERC’s issuance of the 
certificate, the petitioners first raise a number claims asserting 
that FERC violated NEPA by failing — in numerous ways — 
to consider the full scope of the Project’s environmental 
impacts.  The petitioners specifically challenge FERC’s 
conclusion that the Project’s impacts should be considered 
separately from the impacts of the PennEast and SRL projects, 
as well as FERC’s determination that the Project would not 
significantly impact the potable wells in the project’s vicinity. 
 
NEPA is “primarily [an] information-forcing” statute; it 
“directs agencies only to look hard at the environmental effects 
of their decisions, and not to take one type of action or 
another.”  Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 
938 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).  In addition to that general 
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directive, NEPA created the Council of Environmental Quality 
(“CEQ”) to issue regulations to effectuate the statute.  These 
regulations are “‘mandatory’ for all federal agencies, carry the 
force of law, and are entitled to ‘substantial deference.’”  Del. 
Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Marsh v. Or. 
Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989)).  A court 
reviewing an agency decision under NEPA and its 
implementing regulations may only overturn an agency action 
that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); 
see also Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 685 F.3d at 271.  So long as 
the agency takes a “‘hard look’ at the environmental 
consequences” the agency has satisfied its responsibilities and 
a reviewing court may not “substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency as to the environmental consequences of its 
actions.”  Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) 
(quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)).  In other words, NEPA “requires informed 
decisionmaking ‘but not necessarily the best 
decision.’”  WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 303 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting New York v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
  
1.  Segmentation of PennEast 
Under NEPA and its implementing regulations, when 
evaluating a proposed project’s environmental impacts, an 
agency must take account of “connected,” “cumulative,” and 
“similar actions” whose impacts should be “discussed in the 
same impact statement” as the project under review.  40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.25(a).  Where an agency instead attempts to consider 
such related actions separately by segmenting the mandated 
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unified review into multiple independent analyses that insulate 
each project from the impacts created by its sister projects, it 
“fails to address the true scope and impact of the activities that 
should be under consideration” and therefore runs afoul of 
NEPA.  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 753 F.3d 1304, 
1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“DRN I”).  The petitioners allege that 
FERC did just that, by refusing to consider the Project’s 
impacts in conjunction with the anticipated impacts of the 
proposed PennEast pipeline that, when completed, will be the 
source of the gas that NJNG will transport using the capacity 
added by the Project.  The petitioners insist that PennEast is a 
“connected action” that must be considered together with the 
Project because the two pipeline projects “lack independent 
functional utility.”  Pet. Br. 16 (citing Native Ecosystems 
Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 894–95 (9th Cir. 
2002)).  Given that the undisputed facts here clearly attest to 
the projects’ separateness, we conclude that FERC correctly 
rejected this argument.  
 
Actions are deemed “connected” with one another if 
they “(i) [a]utomatically trigger other actions which may 
require environmental impact statements,” “(ii) [c]annot or 
will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or 
simultaneously,” or “(iii) [a]re interdependent parts of a larger 
action and depend on the larger action for their 
justification.”  40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1).  The petitioners’ 
claim relies on the third basis for finding a connected action.  
In line with the prevailing view amongst the Courts of Appeals, 
both FERC and the petitioners agree that the essential question 
is whether the segmented projects have independent utility.  
See Pet. Br. 16; App. 45; see also, e.g., Coal. on W. Valley 
Nuclear Wastes v. Chu, 592 F.3d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The 
proper test to determine relatedness under 40 C.F.R. § 
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1508.25(a)(1)(iii) is whether the project has independent 
utility.” (quoting Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 
1134, 1142 (2d Cir. 1988))); Great Basin Mine Watch v. 
Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).  Projects 
have independent utility where “each project would have taken 
place in the other’s absence.”  Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
685 F.3d 411, 426 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).   
 
The petitioners’ theory of interdependence — or, stated 
in the inverse, the lack of independent utility — relies entirely 
on their unfounded contention that “Transco’s sole stated 
purpose for the Project is to supply capacity to NJNG from the 
PennEast Line.”  Pet. Br. 16.  But this is simply not so.  The 
statements that the petitioners point to in support merely 
articulate the undisputed fact that the Project would supply 
capacity to NJNG; they are agnostic as to the source of the gas 
that would utilize the capacity.  App. 887, 1419.7  Rather, as 
FERC concluded below, the agreement between NJNG and 
Transco concerning the Project makes clear both that NJNG 
contracted for Transco’s capacity without regard to the source 
(or even availability) of the natural gas — which NJNG is 
alone responsible for sourcing — and, more importantly, that 
the actual source of the physical supply for the capacity added 
by the Project is the Station 210 Zone 6 pooling point, not the 
                                              
7 Notably, only a few pages later in their brief, the 
petitioners again cite to page 887 of the appendix, but this time 
assert that the Project’s “sole purpose was to connect one of 
[Transco’s] existing pipelines to a new intrastate SRL pipeline 
to be constructed by NJNG.”  Pet. Br. 22.  It goes without 
saying that the “sole purpose” of the pipeline cannot be both to 
connect to PennEast and to connect to the Transco Mainline. 
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PennEast line.8  In addition, FERC found the PennEast 
project’s proposed capacity of 1,107,000 dekatherms per day 
is 90 percent subscribed by 12 different shippers, such that 
NJNG’s subscription makes up less than 15 percent of the 
pipeline’s capacity.  App. 47–50; 80.  In other words, the 
Project would go forward even if PennEast were not built (such 
that NJNG could not obtain PennEast gas to consume 
Transco’s capacity) and conversely the PennEast project would 
go forward even if the Project were not built (such that 
PennEast could not deliver its gas to NJNG).  
 
Indeed, in their reply, the petitioners all but concede that 
their segmentation claim fails.  They acknowledge that 
PennEast has independent utility from the Project because it 
serves many shippers apart from NJNG.  Reply Br. 7.  They 
further concede that, even if PennEast is not built, NJNG could 
use the extra capacity provided by the Project to transport gas 
purchased from another supplier and moreover that NJNG’s 
contract with Transco obligates it “to obtain the gas regardless 
of whether the Penn East project is built.”   Reply Br. 7.  The 
petitioners’ continued argument that FERC improperly 
segmented the Project and PennEast thus relies on the 
petitioners’ bare assertion that this contractual setup — which 
establishes that NJNG must use the Project’s increased 
capacity whether or not the gas comes from the PennEast line 
— is entirely irrelevant to determining whether the sole 
                                              
8 The Zone 6 pooling point is located north of Station 
205 (where the gas would divert down Transco’s Trenton-
Woodbury lateral for delivery to NJNG at Station 203), which 
is itself located north of the point where PennEast is set to 
connect to the Transco Mainline. 
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purpose of the Project is to connect PennEast and the SRL.  But 
even to describe the petitioners’ argument is to refute it.  If just 
constructing the Project — and thus adding the capacity that 
NJNG requires — is sufficient to meet Transco’s contractual 
obligation, such that NJNG must buy the capacity regardless 
of any other contingency (such as PennEast’s status), then the 
Project’s construction alone plainly serves an independent 
purpose separate and apart from whatever happens to the 
PennEast pipeline.9  See, e.g., NRDC v. U.S. Nuclear 
                                              
9 Because NJNG’s contract with Transco makes no 
mention of PennEast, the petitioners’ reliance on the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s rejection of an 
argument similar to the one FERC advances here in 
inapposite.  In DRN I, the court accepted that proof of a 
project’s “commercial and financial viability . . . when 
considered in isolation” from the other projects that were 
allegedly being segmented was “potentially an important 
consideration in determining whether the substantial 
independent utility factor has been met,” but concluded that the 
“shipping contracts in this case” were insufficient because the 
contracts themselves tended to show that the projects were in 
fact “interdependent.”  753 F.3d at 1316 (emphasis 
added).  Specifically, the court noted that the contract at issue 
calculated its rates by taking into account the costs and 
capacities of the other projects and had a provision explicitly 
allowing for a rate adjustment in the event of a the construction 
of one of the improperly segmented projects.  Id. at 
1317.  These provisions highlighted the interconnectedness of 
the projects.  Here, by contrast, Transco and NJNG’s contract 
makes no mention of PennEast, the negotiated rate does not 
depend on the source of the gas, and the contract clearly 
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Regulatory Comm’n, 879 F.3d 1202, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(rejecting as insufficient to rebut a finding of economic 
viability a petitioner’s claim that the developer had 
“envisioned” the project “as part of a larger” development 
plan).  
 
To conclude otherwise, the petitioners confuse the 
means of the Project for its ends.  The Project exists to fulfill 
NJNG’s need for gas in southern New Jersey, a need that will 
exist and require satisfaction whether or not PennEast is 
constructed.  As we elaborate on below in discussing the need 
for the Project, NJNG required more supply to shore-up the 
southern parts of the state after Hurricane Sandy.  App. 
1419.  To obtain that supply, NJNG contracted (1) with 
Transco to increase its pipeline’s capacity and (2) with 
PennEast to get the gas to Transco.  But while Transco’s 
capacity increase is necessary to the plan, PennEast’s 
participation is not.  NJNG can (and by contract, must) simply 
buy gas from the Zone 6 pooling point that was delivered by a 
different supplier.     
 
Finally, even if the petitioners are correct that we are 
obligated to ignore the contractual terms and focus only on the 
functionality of the pipeline, such an analysis points 
                                              
establishes that NJNG is solely responsible for acquiring the 
gas supply.  Unlike in Delaware Riverkeeper, then, the Project 
is financially independent of PennEast, because it will be paid 
for and utilized regardless of PennEast’s existence.  Under 
Delaware Riverkeeper’s own framework, this evidence is an 
“important consideration” in the independent utility 
analysis.  Id. at 1316. 
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conclusively in FERC’s favor.  Transco’s Mainline can change 
the direction of gas flow depending on market conditions.  See 
App. 49–501.  The Station 210 Zone 6 Pooling point 
(connecting Transco’s Leidy line to the Mainline) thus can 
either send gas from the Leidy line to the South or pull flow 
from the Gulf of Mexico northward, depending on market 
factors — such as where the cheaper gas is being produced.  
App. 49.  The PennEast pipeline will connect to the Transco 
Mainline south of the Station 210 Zone 6 pool from which 
NJNG has contracted with Transco to obtain the supply created 
by the project.  Accordingly, the Zone 6 pool will only be filled 
with gas physically brought in by the PennEast line during 
times when the Mainline is running South-to-North.  The 
mechanics of the Transco Mainline’s flow — determined 
without consideration of the NJNG contract — make it highly 
unlikely that the physical gas flowing from the Zone 6 pool, 
through the Transco lateral, to the SRL will only be gas piped 
in by PennEast.  In a pipeline, gas is fungible, so “its 
‘transportation’ does not always take the form of the physical 
carriage of a particular supply of gas from its starting point to 
its destination.”  Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 899 F.2d 
1250, 1254 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  NJNG’s contract to purchase 
gas from PennEast and its simultaneous contract with Transco 
for capacity to transport that exact amount of gas was not, as 
the petitioners argue to this Court, a contract to purchase and 
transport PennEast’s physical gas to the SRL.  It was rather a 
contract to purchase an amount of gas from PennEast for 
inclusion in the Transco system, supported by a separate 
contract between NJNG and Transco to transport that same 
amount of gas from Transco’s pooling station to the SRL.  As 
FERC explained in its order denying rehearing, although “it is 
feasible, using backhaul and other methods, that natural gas 
from the PennEast Project could ultimately be delivered on 
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Transco to reach the” SRL, that is not the way that the Mainline 
will necessarily operate.  App. 81 n.36.  The Project will thus 
often service the SRL with non-PennEast-derived natural gas, 
cementing our conclusion that the Project has a value 
independent of the PennEast line.10   
 
Because we conclude that the Project’s purpose is to 
supply the capacity that NJNG requested from their Zone 6 
pool, and that the source of the pool’s gas will be determined 
based on market conditions, we agree that FERC’s refusal to 
consider PennEast a “connected action” in the Project’s EA 
was not arbitrary and capricious. 
 
2.  Consideration of the SRL 
a.  Direct Review 
As an intrastate pipeline, the SRL does not fall within 
FERC’s jurisdiction under the NGA.  Nevertheless, in 
                                              
10 On this point, it is noteworthy that as of the time this 
case was submitted, the Project had been completed and placed 
into service, see FERC Docket CP15-89, Submittal 20180329-
5212 (Mar. 29, 2018), whereas the PennEast pipeline had only 
just been approved by FERC, see PennEast Pipeline Co., 162 
FERC ¶ 61,053 (2018).  See generally, e.g., Town of Norwood 
v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 412 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(holding that courts may take judicial notice of “the underlying 
FERC proceedings”).  That the Project is operational and 
transporting gas even though PennEast has not yet even begun 
construction shows conclusively that the Project is not reliant 
on PennEast’s existence. 
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recognition of the fact that in some cases FERC “is required 
under NEPA to give some environmental consideration of 
nonjurisdictional facilities,” FERC has developed a four-factor 
balancing test “to determine whether there is sufficient federal 
control over a project to warrant environmental 
analysis.”  Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC, 373 F.3d 
1323, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  Under the test, FERC considers  
 
(1) whether the regulated activity comprises 
“merely a link” in a corridor type project; (2) 
whether there are aspects of the non-
jurisdictional facility in the immediate vicinity of 
the regulated activity that uniquely determine the 
location and configuration of the regulated 
activity; (3) the extent to which the entire project 
will be within the Commission’s jurisdiction; 
and (4) the extent of cumulative federal control 
and responsibility. 
 
Id. at 1333–34 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 380.12(c)(2)(ii)).  As the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
explained, the purpose of this test is to limit consideration of 
the environmental impacts of non-jurisdictional facilities to 
cases in which those facilities “are built in conjunction with 
jurisdictional facilities and are an essential part of a major 
federal action having a significant effect on the 
environment.”  Id. at 1334.  
 
Applying the test in its order denying the petitioners’ 
request for rehearing, FERC concluded that “on balance” the 
factors weighed against federalizing the SRL.  App. 83.  It 
reached this conclusion after giving careful attention to each 
factor.  As to the first factor, for the same reasons that PennEast 
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and the Project were not improperly segmented, FERC 
concluded that PennEast, the SRL, and the Project do not 
comprise a single corridor type project and that the Project 
would be a comparatively minor element compared to the 30-
mile SRL.  On the second factor, FERC concluded that the 
SRL did not “uniquely determine” the location of the project, 
because the SRL needed only to connect to the Transco lateral 
at some point at or downstream of the newly constructed 
Station 203, not to the compressor station itself.  The location 
of Station 203, accordingly, was not uniquely dictated by the 
needs of the SRL.  Regarding the third factor, FERC explained 
that (excluding PennEast which, as noted, is not part of the 
Project) the jurisdictional Project is dwarfed by the size of the 
SRL.  FERC rejected the contention that its oversight of the 
PennEast’s and the Project’s costs — which the petitioners 
assert will be passed on to SRL ratepayers — means that FERC 
has decisional authority impacting the SRL.  As FERC further 
explained, because each pipeline is owned by different 
companies, there will be no cost sharing between them; rather, 
shippers using each line will bear their own costs.  Moreover, 
the tariffs of SRL, as an intrastate line, are governed by the 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and FERC has no role in 
funding, approving, or overseeing the SRL’s construction or 
operation.  Finally, concerning the fourth factor, FERC noted 
the almost total absence of federal control over the SRL and 
rejected the petitioners’ argument that, by briefly traversing a 
federal military base and in light of some generally applicable 
federal permitting requirements, the SRL was subject to 
significant cumulative federal control.  Although we recognize 
that one could quibble with its analysis of the second factor, 
we discern no abuse of discretion in FERC’s final analysis or 
its weighing of the factors.   
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The petitioners’ argument that the first factor is satisfied 
is based solely on their view that the Project, when considered 
in conjunction with the 122-mile PennEast line, is significantly 
larger than the SRL.  But this avenue of attack is foreclosed by 
our agreement with FERC’s determination that the PennEast 
line was properly segmented from the Project.  The petitioners’ 
assertion that FERC has de facto jurisdiction over the SRL by 
virtue of its oversight over the Project’s rates which in turn 
impacts the SRL’s rates, even if accurate, articulates a logic 
that would extend FERC oversight over every non-
jurisdictional project that attaches to an interstate pipeline.  
Such a rule would swallow the non-jurisdictional exception 
altogether.  By its nature, a pipeline network consists of 
interstate and intrastate projects, and so the projects’ 
connectedness alone — along with inherent cross-effects 
created by that connection — cannot weigh meaningfully in 
favor of federal control over purely intrastate projects.  See 
New River, 373 F.3d at 1334 (repudiating view that would 
require “the Commission to extend its jurisdiction over non-
jurisdictional activities simply on the basis that they were 
connected to a jurisdictional pipeline”).  Finally, that the SRL 
(1) would need to obtain an easement from the federal 
government, (2) traverses a federally designated National 
Reserve (managed by a state agency), and (3) must abide by 
generally applicable pipeline safety regulations are slim reeds 
upon which to assert cumulative federal control over the entire 
SRL.  See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 
556 F.3d 177, 195 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the fact that 
a federal permit must be secured prior to commencing — and 
“is central to the success” of — a project, “does not itself give 
the [permitting agency] ‘control and responsibility’ over the 
entire” project); New River, 373 F.3d at 1334 (deferring to 
FERC’s determination of insufficient control despite 
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petitioner’s argument that the project at issue was subject to 
numerous federal licensing requirements).  Because the above 
three factors weigh clearly against asserting federal jurisdiction 
over the SRL, the possibility that the location of Station 203 — 
which links up to the SRL — was dictated in part by the 
location of the SRL does not render FERC’s ultimate balancing 
arbitrary and capricious.  The record evidence falls short of 
showing that the location was “uniquely determine[d]” by the 
SRL, but even if it did, this factor alone would not change the 
reasonableness of FERC’s balancing, to which we accordingly 
defer.  See New River, 373 F.3d at 1334 (rejecting petitioner’s 
claim that satisfying the second factor, alone, is sufficient “to 
tip the balance in the four-factor test”). 
 
b.  Cumulative Impacts 
The petitioners alternatively argue that, even if FERC 
were not required to assert jurisdiction over the SRL, it was 
nevertheless required under NEPA to assess whether — in 
conjunction with the jurisdictional Project — the non-
jurisdictional SRL would foreseeably have cumulative impacts 
on the environment.  Under NEPA’s implementing 
regulations, FERC is required to consider “the incremental 
[environmental] impact” of the jurisdictional action when 
added to the existing or “reasonably foreseeable” impacts of 
other actions, whether or not jurisdictional.  40 C.F.R. §§ 
1508.7, .25; see also id. § 1508.7 (“Cumulative impacts can 
result from individually minor but collectively significant 
actions taking place over a period of time.”).  When conducting 
a cumulative-impacts analysis, FERC:  
 
[M]ust identify (i) the ‘area in which the effects 
of the proposed project will be felt’; (ii) the 
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impact expected ‘in that area’; (iii) those ‘other 
actions — past, present, and proposed, and 
reasonably foreseeable’ that have had or will 
have impact ‘in the same area’; (iv) the effects of 
those other impacts; and ([v]) the ‘overall impact 
that can be expected if the individual impacts are 
allowed to accumulate.’ 
Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting TOMAC v. Norton, 433 
F.3d 852, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).   
 
In line with this test, FERC determined that the 
Project’s “main region of influence” in which cumulative 
impacts might be felt was .25 miles from each of the Project’s 
components, but nevertheless considered the cumulative 
impacts of the SRL, PennEast line, and other projects even 
though they largely fell outside of the Project’s area of 
influence.  FERC recognized that both the Project and the SRL 
would impact wetlands, but concluded based on the Project’s 
limited geographic and durational impact, along with FERC’s 
mandated mitigation measures, that any cumulative effects 
would be minor.  It reached similar conclusions regarding 
impacts to vegetation and wildlife, explaining that cumulative 
effects are greatest when projects are built in the same 
geography, during the same time period, and where the impacts 
are expected to be long-term.  FERC noted that the SRL, 
although largely occurring within existing rights of way, would 
be a significant pipeline project situated in a variety of habitats, 
including the protected Pinelands Area, and would be subject 
to extensive state-level regulation that would determine its 
ultimate environmental impacts.  FERC accordingly outlined 
the potential area and kinds of resources that the SRL could 
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impact but — in recognition of the ongoing state regulation — 
did not firmly conclude how the impacts would manifest.  
Nonetheless, it determined that the Project’s largely short-term 
effects on vegetation and wildlife would not result in 
cumulative long-term impacts, even when added to the SRL’s 
potentially greater impacts, which would in any event be 
controlled by state regulators.  FERC similarly concluded that 
the Project’s contribution to cumulative impacts on land use 
would minimal, given that only a small portion of the land 
permanently impacted by the Project would be forested, 
compared to the varied and more expansive terrain impacted 
by the miles-long SRL.  Based on its finding that “each project 
would be designed to avoid or minimize impacts on water 
quality, forest, and wildlife resources,” and given the Project’s 
expected “temporary and minor effects,” FERC concluded that 
the Project “would not result in cumulative impacts.”  App. 
1465, 1474. 
 
The petitioners complaint is not that the .25 mile area 
was incorrect,11 but that FERC failed to take full account of all 
the environmental impacts across the entire span of pipelines 
other than the project under review — impacts far afield from 
the geographic area impacted by the Project — merely because 
those pipelines will ultimately be part of the same network as 
that served by the Project.  To echo the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, such an expansive reading of 
                                              
11 Rightly so, given that the “determination of the size 
and location of the relevant geographic area ‘requires a high 
level of technical expertise,’ and thus ‘is a task assigned to the 
special competency of’ the Commission.”  Sierra Club, 827 
F.3d at 49 (quoting Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412). 
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the cumulative impacts requirement “draws the NEPA circle 
too wide for the Commission,” which need only review 
impacts likely to occur in the area affected by the project under 
FERC review.  Sierra Club, 827 F.3d at 50.  In this case, 
notwithstanding its determination — uncontested on appeal — 
that the area impacted by the Project was of an exceptionally 
small size, FERC considered the cumulative impact of the 
totality of the SRL (and PennEast) pipeline and determined that 
their cumulative impact was insignificant.  In light of the 
gratuitousness of FERC’s extended cumulative impacts 
review, the petitioners’ complaint — which concedes the 
sufficiency of FERC’s analysis as it relates to wetlands — that 
FERC gave short-shrift to its consideration of the SRL’s 
impact on vegetation, wildlife, and aquatic species fails to 
persuade us.   
 
The core of the petitioners’ argument, that the SRL “as 
a major linear project” that will span “approximately 30 miles 
in length” will result in “considerable” environmental impacts 
along its path, Pet. Br. 20, itself defeats their claim that FERC 
had to consider all those various and oblique impacts when 
determining whether the SRL would cumulatively impact “the 
same area” as the project before it — involving no new pipeline 
construction and disturbing only the immediately surrounding 
area.  Accordingly, FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously 
when it “acknowledge[d] that these resources may be affected” 
by the SRL but properly determined that “a detailed analysis” 
of the impacts along the entirety of the SRL was “not within 
the scope of our environmental analysis” for the jurisdictional 
Project under review.  App. 53.  By detailing and recognizing 
even environmental impacts outside of the zone impacted by 
the jurisdictional Project, FERC gave the petitioners’ concerns 
the “serious consideration and reasonable responses” that 
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NEPA requires.  Tinicum Twp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 685 
F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2012).  NEPA does not mandate 
exhaustive treatment of effects not plausibly felt in the 
Project’s impact area. 
 
But even taken head-on, the petitioners’ argument is 
unavailing.  Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, FERC did 
consider the SRL’s impact on vegetation and wildlife, and 
given the Project’s “minor . . . impacts” determined that the 
cumulative impacts would be insignificant.  App. 1469.  FERC 
explicitly acknowledged that the SRL may affect the Pinelands 
National Reserve and concluded reasonably that any impacts 
would be mitigated by the responsible state agency overseeing 
the permitting process for that project.  App. 53.  FERC was 
correct to rely upon New Jersey authorities to do so, as opposed 
— as the petitioners would have it — to assuming the worst 
and piggybacking that hypothetical impact onto the otherwise 
compliant jurisdictional Project.12  See, e.g., EarthReports, Inc. 
                                              
12 The determination of whether a cumulative impacts 
analysis is required in the first place depends on a consideration 
of “the likelihood that a given project will be constructed”; 
“[t]he more certain it is that a given project will be completed, 
the more reasonable it is to require a[n] . . . applicant to 
consider the cumulative impact of that project.”  Soc’y Hill 
Towers Owners’ Ass’n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 182 (3d Cir. 
2000); see also id. at 181 (“[T]he concept of ‘cumulative 
impact’ was not intended to expand an inquiry into the realm 
of the fanciful.”).  Here, the petitioners try to have it both ways.  
In arguing that FERC improperly determined that there was a 
public need for the Project, the petitioners accuse FERC of 
accepting Transco’s “speculative” assertion of need given that 
 33 
 
v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (concluding that 
FERC reasonably relied upon the regulated parties’ “future 
coordination with” other regulators in its NEPA assessment); 
Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 207–08 (upholding finding of no 
cumulative impact that was based partly on projected 
mitigation efforts because the mitigation was a condition of 
other permitting regimes to which the project was subject and 
thus was not speculative or conclusory); Friends of 
Ompompanoosuc v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1549, 1555 (2d Cir. 
1992) (concluding that regulated parties’ responsibility to work 
with local authorities on mitigation proposal constituted a 
“rational basis” for FERC finding of no significant 
impact).  Again, NEPA requires no more than the fair 
                                              
“there is a very real possibility that . . . the SRL will [not] go 
forward.”  Pet. Br. 22.  Nevertheless, the petitioners 
simultaneously demand that FERC consider the worst-case 
scenario of environmental impacts from the SRL as part of its 
approval of the Project, without accounting for the state-
mandated mitigation that would necessarily attach to any 
approved plan.  But obviously, if the SRL’s construction is at 
this point so speculative that it cannot be the basis of Transco’s 
proof of public need, then FERC need not consider the 
hypothetical cumulative impacts of that speculative project.  
Especially where, as here, we have concluded that FERC was 
correct to segment the Project and the SRL, our precedent 
demands that it be “sufficiently certain that [the] other projects 
will be constructed” before an agency is required to include a 
cumulative impact analysis in its EA.  Id. at 182.  The 
petitioners’ explicit contention that this certainty is lacking is 
itself a reason to reject their complaints about the sufficiency 
of FERC’s cumulative impacts analysis. 
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consideration and reasonable responses that FERC provided to 
the petitioners’ concerns.  
 
Furthermore, had FERC failed to give the specific 
attention that it did to the various types of impacts that the SRL 
might potentially cause, we would still approve their 
cumulative impact conclusions.  Aside from their challenge to 
FERC’s determination of the Project’s well impacts (discussed 
below), the petitioners do not contend that FERC improperly 
concluded that, taken alone, the Project would not 
“significantly affect[] the quality of the human 
environment.”  App. 64; see also App. 1424 (concluding in the 
EA that “the impacts associated with th[e] Project can be 
sufficiently mitigated to support a finding of no significant 
impact”).  And — again, besides the wells challenge — 
nothing in the petitioners’ briefing suggests that FERC’s 
detailed consideration of the Project’s impacts to the area’s 
geology; water resources; vegetation; wildlife; endangered 
species; cultural resources; land use, recreation, and visual 
resources; or air quality and noise was erroneous or 
wanting.  FERC thus reasonably concluded in the EA that the 
Project’s “minimal impacts” in its service area — relegated 
largely to “geological and soil resources” impacts and other 
temporary impacts — meant that the Project necessarily 
“would not result in cumulative impacts.”  App. 1465, 1469.  
We conclude that FERC did not abuse its discretion in reaching 
this decision.  This is especially true considering that the 
impacts from the SRL that the petitioners allege FERC ignored 
are different than the limited kind of impacts that FERC 
concluded were likely to result from the Project and so are less 
likely to result in cumulatively significant impacts when 
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considered together.13  See Council of Envtl. Quality, 
Considering Cumulative Effects Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act 8 (Jan. 1997) (“Cumulative effects 
need to be analyzed in terms of the specific resource . . . being 
affected.”).  Given that the petitioners failed to show anything 
more than minimal impacts from the Project itself, they have 
failed to show that FERC acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 
determining that the Project would likewise not contribute to 
significant cumulative impacts, even taking into account the 
potential different impacts of the SRL on other areas within the 
Project’s region.  This conclusion is reinforced by the 
petitioners’ own insistence that the SRL’s construction is being 
held up by legal challenges, Pet. Br. 22–24, such that whatever 
impacts it causes will be temporally distinct from the Project’s 
short-term impacts.  See, e.g., Friends of Santa Clara River v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 887 F.3d 906, 926 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(concluding that where an EIS reasonably finds that a project 
is unlikely to have an impact on a given population, that it is 
“also not arbitrary or capricious to conclude that the Project 
would not result in significant cumulative . . . impacts” to that 
                                              
13 For instance, the petitioners argue that FERC failed 
to consider the “cumulative impacts on . . . aquatic species” 
associated with the construction of the Project and the 
SRL.  Pet. Br. 21.  But the EA is clear that the Project “would 
not impact any waterways.”  App. 1445; see also App. 58 
(reiterating that restrictions aimed at protecting certain fish 
species were inapplicable because “no surface waters will be 
affected by project activities”).  Obviously, to the extent that 
the Project is expected to have no impact on aquatic species, it 
cannot incrementally impact whatever aquatic species are 
impacted by the SRL. 
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population); Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. 
FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding 
cumulative impact analysis finding “no significant cumulative 
impacts were expected” where the project under consideration 
“itself was expected to have minimal impacts” and — as is the 
case here — the two projects had distinct construction 
timelines).  By addressing and expressly considering the 
specific concerns raised by the petitioners, FERC “fulfilled 
NEPA’s goal of guiding informed decisionmaking” and 
ensured that FERC at least considered the wisdom of the 
agency action.  Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1370–71; Sierra Club 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(“Our job is simply ‘to ensure that the agency has adequately 
considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its 
actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.’” 
(quoting DRN I, 753 F.3d at 1312–13)). 
 
The petitioners nevertheless argue that this low-impact 
project should be halted as a result of the possibly significant 
— but mostly different-in-kind — impacts of the nearby but 
later-in-time SRL.  But this cannot be how the cumulative 
analysis inquiry operates.  To hold otherwise would permit a 
jurisdictional project with little environmental impact to be 
torpedoed based only on a nearby non-jurisdictional project’s 
significant impact, which FERC has no authority to control or 
mitigate.  Such a rule would effectively condition the approval 
of pipelines operating under federal jurisdiction on the 
fastidiousness of pipeline companies operating in the same 
region under state authorities.  Pipelines subject to lax state 
authorities or state environmental requirements that fall short 
of federal standards could, by mere proximity to a 
jurisdictional project, trump federal regulation and undermine 
FERC’s careful balancing of environmental protection and 
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public energy needs.  Less pernicious, if a proposed state-
governed project has potentially significant impacts but has not 
yet gone through the state’s regulatory process (which could 
be expected to mitigate those impacts), such a project would 
essentially stay all federally regulated projects proposed in the 
area until the state agency either rejects the plan or approves a 
mitigation proposal.  Congress surely did not intend for 
FERC’s exclusive authority to control interstate pipeline 
construction to be so easily usurped by state 
regulators.  Rather, the cumulative impacts analysis was meant 
to address instances where the jurisdictional project itself has 
minor environmental impacts that nevertheless fall short of 
stopping the project, but where — if added to the minor 
impacts from nearby non-jurisdictional projects — the 
cumulative impact of all the projects would be significant.  See 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (“Cumulative impacts can result from 
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking 
place over a period of time.”); cf. id. § 1508.27 (setting out 
considerations for whether a project is “significant,” including 
whether it “is related to other actions with individually 
insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts” (emphasis 
added)).  The analysis was not intended to combine the effects 
of a nearly no-impact project with those of a project with 
potentially serious impacts and then to bar them both.   
 
The relevant question — as FERC correctly understood 
— is rather whether, taking the non-jurisdictional impacts as a 
given, the addition of the jurisdictional project’s impacts on top 
of the other projects’ existing or anticipated impacts renders 
significant those projects’ otherwise insignificant impacts.  See 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (“Cumulative impact is the impact on the 
environment which results from the incremental impact of the 
action when added to other past, present, and reasonably 
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foreseeable actions . . . .” (emphasis added)); Cascadia 
Wildlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 801 F.3d 1105, 1112 
(9th Cir. 2015) (“An agency can take a ‘hard look’ at 
cumulative impacts . . . by . . . incorporating the expected 
impact of [a forthcoming] project into the environmental 
baseline against which the incremental impact of a proposed 
project is measured.”); see also App. 1471 (“Only a small 
portion of forested land use would be impacted by the 
operation of the [Project].  These impacts would not contribute 
significantly to the cumulative impacts of the other projects in 
the region.  Since the . . . [SRL] include[s] a linear pipeline, [it] 
would result in greater temporary and permanent impacts in 
acreage and affect a variety of land uses.”).  In other words, the 
analysis looks at the marginal impact of the jurisdictional 
project when added to the non-jurisdictional projects’ impacts, 
and asks whether the addition of the project under review 
affects a meaningful increase in the projected environmental 
impacts.  See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau 
of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2004); Landmark 
West! v. U.S. Postal Serv., 840 F. Supp. 994, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the 
cumulative impacts analysis requires “the consideration of the 
foreseeable actions of others as background factors, but does 
not require that the impacts of others’ actions be weighed in 
assessing the significance of [the] action[ under review].  
Rather, the [agency] need weigh only the marginal impacts of 
its own actions.”).  Where the other projects’ impacts are 
themselves already significant or greatly outweigh the 
jurisdictional projects’ impacts, such that the jurisdictional 
project will not meaningfully influence the extent of the 
already significant environmental impacts, the cumulative 
impacts test is inapposite.  Were this not so, a single proposed 
project with a significant projected impact would preempt any 
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other development — even no-impact or impact-reducing 
projects — regardless of whether the proposed project 
ultimately will come to fruition or have those expected 
impacts.  Plainly, such an application of the cumulative 
impacts analysis is unreasonable and unwarranted, and we 
reject it.  We conclude that FERC adequately addressed the 
Project’s cumulative impacts. 
 
3. Potable Well Impacts 
The petitioners’ final NEPA-based claim regards 
FERC’s conclusion that the Project’s construction would not 
significantly impact the water quality of wells or cisterns in the 
service area.  In its EA, FERC determined that “[m]inor, 
temporary impacts on groundwater infiltration could occur as 
a result of tree, herbaceous vegetation, or scrub-shrub 
vegetation clearing” around Station 203 during its 
construction, but that Transco would thereafter “restore and 
revegetate cleared areas to pre-construction conditions to the 
maximum extent practicable.”  App. 17–18.  The EA continued 
that, in the event that groundwater is “encountered during 
construction,” Transco would adhere to a series of mitigation 
measures, which would ensure that “impacts on groundwater 
would be adequately minimized.”  App. 18.  Although reaching 
this general conclusion about the risk of groundwater impacts 
as a result of the Project, FERC made no specific finding about 
the impacts to any particular wells or cisterns “within 150 feet 
and up to one mile” from the Project, because at the time of the 
EA, neither FERC nor Transco had identified any such 
resources.  App. 17.  Accordingly, the particular finding that 
FERC did not “anticipate any significant impacts on cisterns, 
wells, or septic systems in the Project areas” was based most 
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directly on FERC’s understanding that those resources simply 
did not exist.  
 
Transco and several commenters subsequently notified 
FERC that there were numerous private wells in the project 
area.  Nevertheless, based on additional assurances from 
Transco that it would remedy any damage or disruption to the 
water supply — and without revising the EA or identifying the 
specific number of potentially impacted wells — FERC issued 
Transco the certificate, subject to additional monitoring and 
mitigation conditions.  These included the requirement that 
Transco identify and file the locations of all private wells in the 
Station 203 project area prior to beginning construction; 
conduct “pre- and post-construction monitoring of well yield 
and water quality”; and report to FERC any complaints it 
receives from well owners and how the complaints were 
resolved.  App. 56.  Some of the petitioners challenged the 
propriety of the certificate, arguing that the underlying 
assessment of the impact on wells was necessarily insufficient 
given that it was made without regard to the number of 
impacted wells.  In denying the motion for rehearing, FERC 
rejected this claim, asserting that the certificate’s requirements 
that Transco identify and monitor the wells, and Transco’s 
promise to “minimize and remediate impacts” and “to repair, 
replace, or provide alternative sources of potable water” in the 
event of more permanent impacts, “appropriately identify and 
mitigate any potential impacts to groundwater 
resources.”  App. 87.   
 
On appeal, the petitioners in large part renew the 
challenge levied before FERC.  They add that even if FERC 
were not absolutely required to identify the number of affected 
wells, its proposed mitigation plan is inadequate because:  (1) 
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it cannot effectively be enforced, and (2) because without 
knowing how many wells are potentially impacted, it is 
impossible to determine whether the proposed mitigation plan 
will suffice.  The petitioners contend that FERC’s “no 
significant impacts” conclusion was therefore arbitrary and 
capricious because it was not based on sufficient evidence.  
Because we conclude that FERC sufficiently established the 
efficacy of the proposed mitigation plan, we will not disturb its 
conclusion that the Project’s groundwater impacts — if any — 
will not be significant.   
 
When an agency’s “proposed mitigation measures [are] 
supported by substantial evidence, the agency may use those 
measures as a mechanism to reduce environmental impacts 
below the level of significance.”  Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. 
Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 17 (2d Cir. 1997).  Mitigation measures 
will be deemed “sufficiently supported” where “they are likely 
to be adequately policed,” such as where the mitigation 
measures are included as mandatory conditions in a 
permit.  Id.; Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d 938, 955–56 (9th Cir. 
2008) (explaining that an “‘agency is not required to develop a 
complete mitigation plan detailing the precise nature . . . of the 
mitigation measures[,]’ so long as the measures are ‘developed 
to a reasonable degree.’” (quoting Nat’l Parks & Conservation 
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 734 (9th Cir. 2001))).   
 
Nor must the proposed mitigation be included in the 
original EA in order to pass muster under NEPA.  If FERC in 
its certificate order addresses the commenters’ concerns about 
the adequacy of the EA’s analysis and clearly articulates its 
mitigation plan therein, it takes “the requisite ‘hard look’ at the 
impact of the . . . Project on the environment.”  DRN II, 857 
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F.3d at 401 (quoting NRDC v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988)).  This is because NEPA’s “purpose is not to 
generate paperwork — even excellent paperwork — but to 
foster excellent action” and to “[e]nsure that environmental 
information is available to public officials and citizens before 
decisions are made and before actions are taken.”  40 C.F.R. § 
1500.1; Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 409 (“By requiring an impact 
statement Congress intended to assure [consideration of the 
environmental impact] during the development of a proposal . 
. . .”).  The command to conduct an EA is not an end in itself, 
but a means to achieve informed decision-making, and 
reviewing courts should not elevate the form of the analysis 
over its substance by requiring that the totality of the relevant 
information be included in the EA in the first instance.  “The 
role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has 
adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact 
of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious,” 
Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1983), 
not to police precisely how — or in what form — the agency 
engages in the requisite analysis.  See, e.g., DRN II, 857 F.3d 
at 396 (explaining that courts should not “flyspeck” FERC’s 
NEPA analysis and should defer to its expertise “so ‘long as 
the agency’s decision is fully informed and well-considered’” 
(quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Myersville Citizens 
for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1323 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015), then quoting Hodel, 865 F.2d at 294)).  Where the 
EA fails to address fully a specific issue but the record makes 
clear that the agency and public were apprised of the deficiency 
and that the agency sufficiently considered the matter before 
making a final decision or permitting actions to be taken, it has 
fulfilled NEPA’s procedural mandate.   
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FERC determined in the EA that groundwater effects 
were expected to be temporary, limited, and controlled by 
Transco’s adoption of prophylactic measures to limit sediment 
discharge.  After it learned of the wells’ existence, FERC 
imposed supplementary measures to mitigate and remedy any 
damage to private wells in the project area, along with a 
reporting framework to ensure Transco’s compliance.  We 
conclude therefore that the record establishes that FERC 
adequately considered the potential impact to the wells, 
responded appropriately to the concern, and reasonably 
concluded that in light of its intervention, any impact would be 
insignificant.  Given that FERC in the EA had already reached 
a reasoned conclusion regarding the intensity of the expected 
effects of the construction — which it deemed to be minor and 
transient — its failure to detail fully the number of wells 
potentially impacted by this limited impact is insufficient to 
render its findings arbitrary and capricious.  The petitioners do 
not contend that FERC underestimated how the construction 
would impact a well in the project area, but only that it has not 
confirmed how many wells this uncontested calibration would 
disturb.  FERC could reasonably conclude that a consequence 
whose intensity was unlikely to significantly impact any one 
resource was likewise unlikely to significantly impact 
additional — but distinct — instances of that same resource.14 
 
This case is therefore unlike the Babbitt case cited by 
the petitioners, in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the agency’s EA that made a no significant 
                                              
14 Nor have the petitioners advanced any reason to 
believe that minor passing impacts to several individually 
owned wells would have cumulatively significant impacts. 
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impact finding without articulating the expected intensity or 
expected consequences of the projected environmental 
effects.  See 241 F.3d at 732.  The Babbitt case involved the 
impact of growing cruise ship traffic in the Glacier Bay.  The 
agency recognized that expanded traffic would increase the 
level of underwater disturbance, the risk of collision with sea 
life, and the risk of oil spills, and acknowledged that the 
intensity and effects of such increases on the sea life were 
“unknown.”  Id. at 729.  Nevertheless, the agency asserted that, 
with the proposed mitigation, the action would have no 
significant effect on the environment.  Id.  In rejecting the 
sufficiency of the agency’s analysis, the court explained that 
the EA’s uncertainty over the intensity of the projected 
environmental effects necessitated the preparation of the more 
comprehensive environmental impact statement.  Id. at 731–
32.  Given the agency’s failure to quantify the likely intensity 
or effect of the action, and the agency’s failure to impose 
mandatory mitigation conditions as part of the EA, the court 
likewise rejected the agency’s assertion that its mitigation plan 
could adequately control these unknown effects.  Id. at 734–
36. 
 
The issue in Babbitt was not that the agency did not 
know, for instance, how many sea lions would be impacted by 
the traffic increase, but rather that it did not know the intensity 
of impact in the first place.  We recognize that in certain 
circumstances — such as where the intensity of the impact is 
expected to be moderate or significant — the failure to identify 
the number of species or resources impacted could render the 
EA insufficient because the magnitude of gross harm would be 
too uncertain.  That is not the case here, however, where FERC 
identified the intensity of the impacts and concluded that they 
would be minor and temporary.  Even without knowing the 
 45 
 
precise number of wells potentially impacted, FERC could 
reasonably conclude that the total environmental impact of 
such low-intensity and fleeting effects would be insignificant, 
especially when accounting for the mandatory mitigation and 
remedial conditions imposed upon Transco in the certificate, 
which FERC has assured the Court that it will enforce.15  See 
                                              
15 The petitioners assert that the mitigation measures are 
insufficient because Transco is not required to affirmatively 
report impacted wells and FERC cannot adequately impose 
remedial measures if Transco fails to comply.  FERC reiterated 
in its order denying rehearing, however, that if Transco’s post-
construction testing showed decreased well yield or water 
quality, FERC has authority to require Transco to mitigate the 
impact.  App. 88.  FERC’s clarification implies Transco’s 
responsibility to inform FERC of any changes.  Moreover, 
landowners can be expected to complain to Transco if there is 
a noticeable change in their well’s yield or water quality, 
complaints which Transco is expressly required to pass on to 
FERC.  If the impacts on the wells are so negligible that the 
landowner does not even notice them, then such impacts are — 
as FERC predicts will be the case — insignificant and do not 
require mitigation.  Finally, the petitioners in their Reply brief 
do not challenge FERC’s authority to enforce any required 
remediation, which we conclude is amply supported by the 
applicable federal legislation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717o (granting 
FERC the “power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, 
issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and 
regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions” of the NGA); id. § 717f (“The Commission 
shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate 
and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such 
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id. at 735 (recognizing that even where mitigation procedures 
are not fully developed, “the imposition of special conditions, 
enforced through a permit,” and adequately supervised could 
“ensure[] that the measures would be enforced in a manner that 
properly reduced negative environmental impact”). We 
therefore reject the petitioners’ claim that FERC’s treatment of 
the well impacts ran afoul of NEPA. 
 
C.  Need for the Project 
FERC must determine that the proposed project “is or 
will be required by the present or future public convenience 
and necessity,” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e), prior to granting a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity under the NGA.  
This inquiry involves two steps.  First, FERC asks whether “the 
project will ‘stand on its own financially’ because it meets a 
‘market need.’”  Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1379 (quoting 
Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1309).  The point of this step is “to 
ensure that a project will not [need to] be subsidized by existing 
customers.”  Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1309.  This element can 
accordingly be established by the existence of contracts 
subscribing to the capacity of the project.  Id.  Second — if 
market need is shown — FERC will then “balance the benefits 
and harms of the project, and will grant the certificate if the 
former outweigh the latter.”  Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 
                                              
reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and 
necessity may require.”); id. § 717t-1 (granting FERC the 
power to impose civil fines of up to $1 million per day for the 
violation of “any rule, regulation, restriction, condition, or 
order made or imposed by the Commission under authority of 
this chapter”). 
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1379.  Whether to grant a certificate is “peculiarly within the 
discretion of the Commission,” Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1308 
(quoting Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 257 F.2d 
634, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1958)), and a reviewing court’s task is 
limited to ensuring that “the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors” and not a result of “a 
clear error of judgment.”  Id. (quoting ExxonMobil Gas Mktg. 
Co. v. FERC, 297 F.3d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  FERC’s 
findings of fact — such as a finding of need — are conclusive 
if supported by substantial evidence.  15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). 
 
Applying the above criteria in this case, FERC found “a 
strong showing of public benefit” based upon NJNG’s 
“binding precedent agreement” to purchase 100 percent of the 
Project’s capacity that outweighed the Project’s “minimal 
adverse impacts,” and so granted the certificate.  App. 42.  The 
petitioners challenge this finding as arbitrary and capricious 
because FERC “considered only Transco’s asserted need for 
the Project, ignoring other factual developments” that the 
petitioners assert “demonstrated that the need was 
speculative.”  Pet. Br. 22.  Specifically, the petitioners argue 
that regulatory and legal challenges to both the SRL and 
PennEast created a “very real possibility that neither” project 
would be built, which in the petitioners’ view would “obviat[e] 
the need for the Project.”  Id.  FERC rejected this argument in 
denying the petitioners’ motion for rehearing, noting that 
NJNG’s contract was itself sufficient to establish need and that 
the Project was not reliant on the existence of either the 
PennEast or SRL.  Again, we agree. 
 
The petitioners’ argument that the need for the Project 
is speculative misapprehends the purpose of the analysis, the 
focus of which is on the objective existence of a market need, 
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not the precise mechanics of fulfilling that need.  See, e.g., 
Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1379.  A contract for a pipeline’s 
capacity is a useful indicator of need because it reflects a 
“business decision” that such a need exists.  See App. 76.  If 
there were no objective market demand for the additional gas, 
no rational company would spend money to secure the excess 
capacity.  Cf., e.g., Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 
870, 884 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that, in the ordinary course, a 
company’s “legitimate business decisions” will not be against 
their self-interest).  In this case, FERC reasonably relied on 
NJNG’s binding contract to utilize all of the Project’s capacity 
— a contract that was not contingent on the completion of 
either the SRL or PennEast16 — as evidence of the market need 
and proof that the Project will be self-supporting.  As 
numerous courts have reiterated, FERC need not “look[] 
beyond the market need reflected by the applicant’s existing 
contracts with shippers.”  Myersville, 783 F.3d at 1311 
(quoting Minisink, 762 F.3d at 111 n.10).  
 
Even were this not the case, the petitioners’ view of the 
need is myopic.  The need is not, as they contend, to provide 
                                              
16 The petitioners concede that “the precedent 
agreements may be binding on NJNG” even if the SRL is not 
built, but curiously insist that this “does not mean the NJNG 
will remain obligated to continue with the precedent agreement 
if the SRL is not completed.”  Reply Br. 5 n.1.  We discern no 
meaning to the word “binding” other than “having legal force 
to impose an obligation,” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014), and so fail to understand the petitioners’ hypothetical in 
which a party to a binding agreement is nonetheless free to 
shirk its enforceable obligations thereunder. 
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capacity for gas to reach the SRL; this is the means of fulfilling 
the need, not the need itself.  Rather, the “need” is for the 
provision of “enhanced reliability and resiliency to NJNG’s 
service territory in Monmouth and Ocean Counties,” App. 790, 
which is why NJNG is building the SRL and why it is seeking 
additional capacity from Transco.  This need exists 
objectively, and independently of the SRL.  If for whatever 
reason NJNG cannot build the SRL as it is proposed, this need 
for “enhanced reliability and resiliency” will endure, and the 
Project will still be necessary to meet that need by providing 
additional capacity for the southward supply of natural 
gas.  Nor, as we explained above, is the Project reliant on 
PennEast’s completion.  Thus, FERC correctly determined 
based on substantial evidence that even if the SRL or PennEast 
were not built, the Project would still serve the public need.  
Because the petitioners do not challenge FERC’s balancing at 
step two of the analysis — regarding which FERC is afforded 
“broad discretion,” Minisink, 762 F.3d at 111 — we conclude 
that FERC properly granted the certificate to Transco. 
 
D.  Good Faith Notice 
The petitioners’ next challenge — that, contrary to the 
requirements of 18 C.F.R. § 157.6(d)(1), Transco failed to 
provide petitioner Bordentown with notice of Transco’s 
application — likewise fails.  Section 157.6(d)(1) required 
Transco to “make a good faith effort to notify all affected 
landowners and towns” of its application, within three days of 
FERC’s March 13, 2015 filing of the Notice of Application 
regarding the Project.  We discern no basis in the record to 
disturb FERC’s conclusion that Transco did so. 
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 Most fundamentally, the petitioners’ claim is 
unsupported by any relevant citation to the record, and is belied 
by FERC’s explicit finding in its order granting the certificate 
that Transco complied with the “intent of the landowner 
notification requirements.”  App. 44.  This finding, like all 
FERC fact-finding, is conclusive where supported by 
substantial evidence.  FERC’s determination is supported by 
Transco’s submission, filed March 24, 2015, that it had 
“mailed notices to all affected landowners” and re-mailed to 
new addresses the notices that were returned undelivered, 
FERC Docket CP15-89, Submittal 20150324-5228 (Mar. 24, 
2015), and FERC’s own investigation confirming the 
submission’s accuracy, App. 44, 96.  By contrast, the 
petitioners’ claim that Bordentown was not given notice is only 
a representation in their appellate brief, which does not 
constitute record evidence, see United States v. Genser, 582 
F.2d 292, 311 (3d Cir. 1978), and is in fact contradicted by the 
record, see, e.g., App. 1735–38 (letters dated September and 
October 2015 in which Transco’s counsel discusses the Project 
with Bordentown’s counsel, and which noted discussions from 
as early as August 2015).  We therefore defer to FERC’s fact-
finding and conclude that Transco satisfied their good faith 
notice requirements.17   
                                              
17 To the extent that the petitioners claim that the alleged 
failure to provide notice implicated their constitutional rights 
to Due Process and thus must be subjected to more exacting 
review, we note that the petitioners at the very least received 
constitutionally sufficient notice of Transco’s project, as 
evidenced by their participation in the notice and comment 
period following the EA and their petitioning for 
rehearing.  See All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, More 
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In addition, FERC has long maintained that notice 
published in the Federal Register satisfies the Commission’s 
notice requirements.  See App. 97.  Given the deference owed 
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, see, e.g., 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less, 
768 F.3d 300, 313 (3d Cir. 2014); Marseilles Land & Water 
Co. v. FERC, 345 F.3d 916, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that “agencies are entitled to great deference in the 
interpretation of their own rules” unless the interpretation is 
“plainly erroneous” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))), FERC’s view that its statutory 
notice requirement was satisfied by the notice of the 
application published in the Federal Register is conclusive of 
this claim. 
 
                                              
or Less, 746 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that 
landowners “received notice ‘reasonably calculated . . . to 
apprise’ them of [the company’s] FERC application” where, in 
the months between the company’s application and FERC’s 
order granting the certificate, the company negotiated with the 
landowners to seek an easement and filed a lawsuit for 
permission to survey the property in relation to the project 
(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 314 (1950))); Moreau v. FERC, 982 F.2d 556, 569 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (holding, in a case where parties had actual notice 
before FERC granted the certificate, that the “Due Process 
Clause does not require notice where those claiming an 
entitlement to notice already knew the matters of which they 
might be notified”). 
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E.  Green Acres Act 
The petitioners’ penultimate claim is that FERC erred 
by granting Transco the certificate because it will permit 
Transco to construct the Project on property subject to 
regulation under New Jersey’s Green Acres Act,18 without first 
seeking state-level approval to divert the property to non–
Green Acres uses.  This argument is facile because the 
petitioners entirely fail to articulate what portion of its 
governing law was violated when FERC neglected to seek New 
Jersey state approval before granting the certificate of public 
necessity, the authority over which Congress exclusively 
vested in FERC. 
 
Although the parties primarily dispute whether the 
Green Acres Act is preempted or whether FERC addressed 
sufficiently the Act’s substantive concerns before granting the 
certificate, we need not even get that far.  Nothing in the NGA, 
NEPA, or its implementing regulations require FERC to do 
anything more than at most consider the proposed land-use and 
                                              
18 The Green Acres Land Acquisition and Recreation 
Opportunities Act of 1975 (“Green Acres Act”) was “designed 
to provide State funding to assist municipalities with the 
acquisition and development of property for conservation and 
recreation” and “required State-level approval of the sale . . . 
of all conservation or recreational properties” either purchased 
with, or owned at the time of, the municipality’s receipt of the 
funding.  Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 584 A.2d 784, 785 
(N.J. 1991). 
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its alternatives.19  There is certainly no requirement that prior 
to issuing a certificate, FERC pass through the procedural 
hoops that the state places upon the alienation of land subject 
to its authority.  The petitioners’ demand that FERC should 
have proceeded with “caution” in light of New Jersey’s 
exacting regulatory scheme, Reply 16, while laudable, finds no 
support in the text of FERC’s regulations.  Given that FERC 
did not have to receive New Jersey’s approval prior to its 
issuance of the certificate, we cannot conclude that it erred by 
failing to do so with regard to the Green Acres Act.20  
                                              
19 Although FERC must consider the environmental 
impacts of the pipeline’s siting and to the extent feasible to 
respect state conservation designations, see, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 
380.15, as a purely process-oriented statute NEPA cannot and 
does not require FERC to undertake any substantive acts, such 
as specifically complying with a state’s land-use 
regulations.  And the petitioners have not argued on appeal that 
FERC’s consideration of the Green Acres property violated 
NEPA’s procedures. 
20 In any event, we note that FERC’s granting of the 
certificate (thereby accepting that the pipeline would pass 
through land subject to the Green Acres Act) was not 
irreconcilable with Transco thereafter going through the 
process mandated by the Act, which Transco has indeed agreed 
to do.  To the extent that Transco would have had to utilize the 
right to seek eminent domain that is conveyed by the receipt of 
the certificate, it would only be because Bordentown — the 
landowner actually subject to the Green Acres Act — refused 
to agree to seek a diversion under the Act or because New 
Jersey refused to permit a diversion.  The petitioners’ argument 
suggests to the contrary that the granting of the certificate 
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If anything, the NGA itself suggests that FERC need not 
concern itself with the legal technicalities concerning — or the 
ownership status of — land upon which FERC determines that 
the placement of a pipeline would be in the public interest.  The 
NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (h), affords certificate holders the right 
to condemn such property, and contains no condition precedent 
other than that a certificate is issued and that the certificate 
holder is unable to “acquire [the right of way] by 
contract.”  Two salient points emerge.  First, this section places 
sole responsibility on the certificate holder — not FERC — to 
secure the legal right to utilize the land at issue.  Second, there 
is no requirement that the certificate holder first attempt to 
acquire the property via the state’s preferred process:  if the 
holder cannot reach an arm’s-length agreement with the 
property owner, then the holder may proceed under § 
717f(h).21  To the extent, then, that any preemption is squarely 
                                              
immediately condemns the property, notwithstanding state 
law.  This is plainly incorrect, as the certificate merely signals 
FERC’s approval of the Project’s siting, based on the 
assumption that Transco will either receive the landowner’s 
permission to use the property or else exercise its statutory 
right to condemn the property.  Because FERC could issue the 
certificate and Transco could still (and, in fact, did) thereafter 
proceed via the Green Acres Act, it is unclear what additional 
“caution” the petitioners expect FERC to afford to the Green 
Acres Act scheme or, indeed, how much caution would in their 
view suffice.  Reply 16. 
21 Although the statute directs the United States District 
Court overseeing the condemnation proceeding to “conform as 
nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in similar 
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at issue here, the NGA already speaks pellucidly about the 
hierarchy of land rights, and it is entirely silent about any 
requirement that the state’s existing regulations concerning the 
land be substantively complied with or respected.  Cf. 
Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 243–
45 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (recognizing that the NGA preempts state 
zoning and land use requirements, save for those enacted under 
the Clean Air Act, CWA, or Coastal Zone Management Act 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d))). 
 
Finally, we would be remiss not to point out that 
although the petitioners levy their challenge against FERC’s 
issuance of the certificate, the real target of their claim is 
actually the Township of Bordentown’s interpretation 
thereof.  FERC, in issuing the certificate, did not specifically 
opine that any particular provision of the Green Acres Act is 
preempted.  See App. 63 (explaining generally in the certificate 
order that state requirements that “prohibit or unnecessarily 
delay Transco from meeting its obligations under this Order” 
are “preempted by the certificate”).  To the extent that 
Bordentown feels compelled to ignore the Green Acres Act as 
a result of FERC granting the certificate, then it is their 
(allegedly overbroad) reading of FERC’s authority that is to 
blame.  If, conversely, Bordentown concludes that the granting 
of the certificate does not override the applicability of the 
Green Acres Act, then “no harm, no foul,” as FERC would not 
                                              
action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the 
property is situated,” this requires district courts to attempt to 
mirror the state courts’ condemnation proceedings, not to adopt 
the state’s administrative scheme concerning the alienation of 
the land at issue.  15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). 
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— in the petitioners’ telling — have exceeded its authority by 
granting the certificate notwithstanding its failure to consider 
the Green Acres Act.  Put simply, “[u]nder either 
interpretation, the certificate order has only whatever 
preemptive force it can lawfully exert, and no more.”  
Myersville, 783 F.3d 1321.  Because FERC, when issuing the 
certificate, did not “purport to compel” Bordentown to 
undertake an act inconsistent with the NGA, and because “no 
provision of the [NGA] identified by [the p]etitioners barred 
[FERC] from issuing a conditional . . . certificate under these 
circumstances,” the petitioners’ Green Acres Act challenge 
fails.  Id. 
 
F.  Cumulative Error 
The petitioners finally ask that we grant the petition 
based on the cumulative effect of FERC’s various alleged 
errors.  Under the cumulative error doctrine — which we have 
to date applied only in the context of criminal trials — a court 
“may determine that, although certain errors do not require 
relief when considered individually, the cumulative impact of 
such errors may warrant a new trial.”  SEC v. Infinity Grp., 212 
F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).  We need not decide whether the 
cumulative error doctrine applies in this type of case, because 
even assuming its applicability, our conclusion that none of 
FERC’s challenged decisions were individually erroneous 
forecloses a cumulative error claim.  See id. 
 
IV.  Challenges to the NJDEP’s Order 
We now turn to the petitioners’ challenge to the 
NJDEP’s conclusion that the New Jersey regulations 
establishing the availability of adjudicatory hearings to contest 
 57 
 
the grant of water quality permits to an interstate pipeline 
project were preempted by federal law (docket No. 17-
3207).  As noted above, we conclude that the NJDEP 
misunderstood the scope of the NGA’s assignment of 
jurisdiction to the federal Courts of Appeals.  Because this 
erroneous view was the only articulated reason for its denial of 
the petitioners’ hearing request, we will remand to the NJDEP 
for reconsideration of the petitioners’ request and to give the 
NJDEP the opportunity to in the first instance address the 
petitioners’ substantive challenges to the provision of the 
permits. 
 
A.  Jurisdiction Under the NGA 
We begin with the language of the federal statute that 
the NJDEP purports divests it of jurisdiction to grant 
adjudicatory hearings arising from permit decisions affecting 
interstate natural gas pipelines.  Under the NGA: 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
circuit in which a facility subject to section 717b 
of this title or section 717f of this title is proposed 
to be constructed, expanded, or operated shall 
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any 
civil action for the review of an order or action 
of a . . . State administrative agency acting 
pursuant to Federal law to issue, condition, or 
deny any permit, license, concurrence, or 
approval . . . required under Federal law . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1).  By the plain language of the statute, 
the conferral of “original and exclusive jurisdiction” to the 
federal Courts of Appeals is limited to “civil action[s] for the 
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review of an order or action of a Federal agency . . . or State 
administrative agency.”  Id.  The term “civil action” is not 
defined either in § 717r or anywhere in the NGA, so we must 
“look to the common meaning of the term in deciding whether 
‘civil action’ encompasses” a state administrative proceeding, 
as the NJDEP claims.  Schindler v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 29 F.3d 607, 609 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  Our review 
assures us that a “civil action” refers only to civil cases brought 
in courts of law or equity and does not refer to hearings or other 
quasi-judicial proceedings before administrative agencies.   
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the word 
‘action’ often refers to judicial cases, not to administrative 
‘proceedings,’” West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 220 (1999), and 
has parsed statutes based on Congress’s understanding of the 
distinction between a civil “action” in a court and an 
administrative “proceeding” at the agency level, New York 
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60–62 (1980).  This 
Court, for its part, has held in the context of interpreting a 
statute providing for attorneys’ fees in taxpayer disputes 
against that IRS that the even broader term “‘civil action or 
proceeding’ includes only judicial proceedings and not 
administrative actions.”  Toner v. Comm’r, 629 F.2d 899, 902 
(3d Cir. 1980).  Our sister Courts of Appeals have reached 
similar conclusions.  In Schindler, for instance, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that “[u]nder Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 3, a ‘civil action’ is commenced by the filing of a complaint 
with the court,” and quoted Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary’s 
definition of “‘civil action’ as ‘litigation in a civil court for the 
recovery of individual right or redress of individual 
wrong.’”  29 F.3d at 609–10.  In another case, that court 
explicitly stated that a hearing “at the administrative level” was 
not “in a ‘civil action.’”  Levernier Const., Inc. v. United 
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States, 947 F.2d 497, 502 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., 
Howard v. Pritzker, 775 F.3d 430, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(distinguishing, in the Title VII context, between the “final 
administrative action” and the subsequent “civil action” 
consisting of “a de novo court proceeding”).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary similarly defines an “action” as a “civil or criminal 
judicial proceeding.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 31 (8th ed. 
1999); see also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 202 (3d ed. 1969) 
(defining a civil action” as “any proceeding in a court of justice 
by which an individual pursues that remedy which the law 
affords him”); Bouvier Law Dictionary Desk Edition (2012) 
(defining a “civil action” as “[a]ll actions in law or equity that 
are not criminal actions” and noting that it is “the generic term 
for all lawsuits”).   
 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that 
administrative hearings, even to the extent that they in some 
ways mirror an adversarial trial, do not constitute proceedings 
in courts of law or equity.  See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 
105, 115 (1977) (holding that “procedural due process in the 
administrative setting does not always require application of 
the judicial model”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 
U.S. 197, 229–30 (1938) (explaining that the purpose of the 
section of the NLRA at issue there, which freed an 
administrative tribunal from applying the rules of evidence 
required “in courts of law and equity,” was to “free 
administrative boards from the . . . technical rules” inherent “in 
judicial proceedings”).  And notably, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has explicitly held, in upholding the constitutionality of 
an administrative body tasked with adjudicating allegation of 
unlawful discrimination, that administrative adjudication 
“involves no . . . intrusion upon subject matter jurisdiction of 
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the judicial branch over traditional causes of action at law or in 
equity.”  David v. Vesta Co., 212 A.2d 345, 359 (N.J. 1965).   
 
Viewed in light of both federal and New Jersey 
authority, and barring any specific statutory language to the 
contrary, a hearing before an administrative body is not a “civil 
action.”  Accordingly, such hearings are not impacted by § 
717r(d)(1)’s assignment to the federal Courts of Appeals the 
exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions challenging a state 
agency’s permitting decision made pursuant to federal 
law.  Because, as relevant here, the NGA explicitly permits 
states “to participate in environmental regulation of [interstate 
natural gas] facilities” under the CWA, Delaware I, 833 F.3d 
at 368, and only removes from the states the right for their 
courts to hear civil actions seeking review of interstate 
pipeline–related state agency orders made pursuant thereto, the 
NGA leaves untouched the state’s internal administrative 
review process, which may continue to operate as it would in 
the ordinary course under state law.  
 
That § 717r(d)(1)’s scope is limited to judicial review 
of agency action, and does not implicate or preempt state 
agency review of the agency’s own decision, is also apparent 
from the statute’s structure.  For example, § 717r(b) — which 
is titled “Review” and discusses appeals to the Courts of 
Appeals from a FERC order — allows a party “aggrieved by 
an order issued by the Commission” to “obtain a review of such 
order” in the Courts of Appeals.  In contrast, § 717r(d)(1) — 
which is titled “Judicial review” — grants “original and 
exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an 
order or action of a . . . or State administrative 
agency.”  (emphasis added).  Congress therefore clearly 
understood the difference between establishing direct judicial 
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“review” over agency action (supplanting any alternative intra-
agency process) and creating an exclusive judicial forum in the 
federal Courts of Appeals for a “civil action” challenging an 
agency’s decision-making (separate from the agency’s own 
internal review process).  As opposed to affirmatively 
installing federal courts to oversee the administrative process, 
as it did in § 717r(b) by placing the “review” of all FERC 
action in the Courts of Appeals, Congress did not interject 
federal courts into the internal workings of state administrative 
agencies.  See Berkshire Envtl. Action Team, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas 
Pipeline Co., 851 F.3d 105, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2017) (“We see 
no indication that Congress . . . intended to dictate how (as 
opposed to how quickly) [the state agency] conducts its 
internal decision-making before finally acting.”).  The myriad 
“state procedures giving rise to orders reviewable under § 
717r(d)(1) may (and undoubtedly do) vary widely from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction,” some of which may permit intra-
agency review and others which may not.  Id. at 109.  Perhaps 
in recognition of this diversity, § 717r(d)(1) merely establishes 
that a party who seeks judicial review of a state agency 
decision via a collateral civil action challenging the correctness 
of the decision, may only bring that civil action directly to the 
federal Courts of Appeals, not the state courts or federal district 
courts.  
 
Finally, although not squarely faced with this issue, this 
Court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have 
implicitly held that state administrative review of interstate gas 
permitting decisions is not preempted by the NGA.  In our 
recent opinion in Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Nos. 
16-2211, 16-2218, 16-2400 (3d Cir. Sept. 4, 2018) (“Delaware 
III”), as well as in Delaware II and Berkshire, the courts 
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considered whether § 717r(d)(1) includes a finality 
requirement such that the federal Courts of Appeals lack 
jurisdiction to hear the case if the state makes available 
additional administrative remedies before the permitting 
decision takes effect.  If the NJDEP’s and Transco’s position 
in this case were a correct reading of the statute (that “any civil 
action for the review” in § 717r(d)(1) includes administrative 
review), then those courts would not have considered whether 
administrative review was an available or mandatory remedy 
in the state’s administrative scheme, because the NGA would 
have cut off any state review other than the initial decision, 
making that decision by default final.  In Delaware II, however, 
this Court assumed that the petitioners could have sought an 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board 
(“EHB”) if they had done so within the time period provided 
in the Pennsylvania statute.  See 870 F.3d at 177.  And in 
deciding the issue left open by Delaware II, we concluded in 
Delaware III that the Pennsylvania DEP’s issuance of a Water 
Quality Certification was final and appealable to this Court 
“[n]otwithstanding the availability of an appeal to the EHB.”  
Delaware III, slip op. at 18.  Although reaching the opposite 
conclusion in regards to the finality of the Massachusetts 
permitting process, the court in Berkshire determined in light 
of that state’s administrative scheme that it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case until the state environmental 
agency held the adjudicatory hearing that petitioners had 
sought, and issued an order thereupon.  See 851 F.3d at 112–
13.22  If the plain impact of § 717r(d)(1) was to remove from 
                                              
22 In Delaware II and III, we distinguished Berkshire on 
the basis that the Pennsylvania statute allowed construction to 
begin immediately upon the issuance of the agency’s decision, 
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the states any and all review over the issuance of such permits, 
those cases would not have proceeded based on the 
understanding — express or implicit — that state 
administrative review was available if desired.  The only 
                                              
whereas the Massachusetts statute at issue in Berkshire did not 
allow any action on the permit until the expiration of the period 
for seeking an adjudicatory hearing.  For present purposes, 
however, the technical details of the state’s administrative 
scheme are irrelevant.  If the NJDEP and Transco are correct 
that the clear text of the statute demands that all review of 
permitting decisions must occur in this Court only, it would be 
counterintuitive to assert that we will ignore the statute’s 
mandate and permit administrative review in contexts where 
the state’s administrative scheme established that an initial 
decision is not final until the parties have an opportunity for 
review.  Cf. Delaware III, slip op. at 12–13 (“Although the 
decisionmaking process we are reviewing is defined by 
Pennsylvania law, we nevertheless apply a federal finality 
standard to determine whether Congress has made the results 
of that process reviewable under the [NGA].”).  Rather, 
accepting the NJDEP’s and Transco’s view, the statute — by 
eliminating any review other than federal Court of Appeals 
review — would operate to make final the state’s initial 
permitting decision, notwithstanding whatever administrative 
review scheme the state otherwise had in place.  Nor, for that 
matter, do the NJDEP or Transco assert that any such carve-
out exists for state schemes that create a single or unitary 
proceeding that includes administrative review.  But as we 
made clear in Delaware III, such distinctions in the state 
administrative scheme are “probative of whether that decision 
is final.”  Id. at 16. 
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plausible conclusion to draw from these cases and from the text 
of the statute itself is that § 717r(d)(1) does not preempt state 
administrative review of interstate pipeline permitting 
decisions. 
 
B.  New Jersey Law 
Having decided that the NGA does not preempt the 
regular operation of New Jersey’s administrative review 
process, we turn next to the determination of whether the 
NJDEP’s refusal to afford the petitioners an adjudicatory 
hearing based on the NJDEP’s erroneous interpretation of the 
NGA amounts to a violation of New Jersey law.  As explained 
below, we conclude that it does.  
 
Federal courts reviewing state agency action afford the 
agencies the deference they would receive under state 
law.  See, e.g., Delaware II, 870 F.3d at 181.  Accordingly, we 
look to New Jersey law to determine the prism of our review 
of the NJDEP’s denial of the petitioners’ request for an 
adjudicatory hearing.  Similar to review under the APA, 
judicial review of New Jersey administrative agency decisions 
is generally limited to a determination of whether the decision 
“is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,” but no deference is 
owed to “the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its 
determination of a strictly legal issue.”  In re Taylor, 731 A.2d 
35, 42 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of 
Sec., 312 A.2d 497, 501 (N.J. 1973)).  Likewise, we afford no 
deference to a state agency’s interpretation of federal law, 
which we instead review de novo.  See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. 
Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 516 (3d Cir. 2001).      
 
 65 
 
The NJDEP regulations implementing the FWPA allow 
a party to request an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the grant 
of an FWW permit.  The FWPA explicitly provides for the 
availability of such a hearing where the requestor is the permit 
seeker, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:9B-20, and — as recognized in the 
NJDEP regulations, see N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7A-21.1(e) 
(FWW); § 7:14A-17.2(c) & (f) (dewatering) — the New Jersey 
Administrative Procedure Act recognizes the rights of 
“[p]ersons who have particularized property interests or who 
are directly affected by a permitting decision” to such a 
hearing, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:14B-3.1(b) & 3.2(c).23  Under its 
regulations, when a third party asserting such a property 
interest seeks an adjudicatory hearing regarding a permit, the 
NJDEP has the responsibility in the first instance to either deny 
the request — and in doing so to provide the reasons for the 
denial — or to approve the request and to forward the matter 
to the Office of Administrative Law, where an ALJ will hear 
the dispute and then issue a report and recommendation for the 
consideration of the NJDEP Commissioner.  N.J. Admin. Code 
§ 7:7A-21.1(f)–(g), 7:14A–17.5(b); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
52:14B-10(a)–(c).  Although the FWW regulations do not 
articulate a standard by which the agency must decide whether 
to approve or deny a petition for an adjudicatory hearing, the 
denial of a request for a hearing on a dewatering permit is 
                                              
23 The petitioners assert that they meet this standard.  In 
denying the petition for a hearing, the NJDEP expressly 
withheld decision on the claim, NJDEP App. 37 n.4, and 
neither the NJDEP nor Transco address this fact-specific issue 
on appeal.  Given our disposition, we need not reach the issue, 
which we leave for the NJDEP to address in the first instance 
when reconsidering the petitioners’ hearing request. 
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limited to an enumerated list of reasons.  N.J. Admin. Code §§ 
7:7A-21.1(f); 7:14A–17.4.  In either case, the NJDEP must 
clearly articulate the reasoning behind its decision so that a 
reviewing court can determine whether the decision was in 
error.  See id. §§ 7:7A-21.1(f); 7:14A–17.4(e); see also In re 
Authorization For Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permit 
6, Special Activity Transition Area Waiver For Stormwater 
Mgmt., Water Quality Certification, 80 A.3d 1132, 1147 (N.J. 
App. Div. 2013); Atl. City Med. Ctr. v. Squarrell, 793 A.2d 10, 
16 (N.J. App. Div. 2002).   
 
Here, the NJDEP denied the petitioners’ request for an 
adjudicatory hearing on the FWW and dewatering permits on 
the sole basis that, pursuant to the NGA, the federal Courts of 
Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear any challenges to 
final decisions granting permits, and accordingly that the 
provisions permitting an adjudicatory hearing to contest such 
decisions were preempted.24  Because we conclude that the 
NJDEP’s reading of the NGA was erroneous as a matter of law 
and that the NGA does not preempt the regular progression of 
intra-agency review of a permitting decision, the NJDEP’s 
denial of the petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing 
                                              
24 We need not determine whether or not a NJDEP 
permitting decision is already final during the period when a 
party may still seek an adjudicatory hearing to challenge the 
permit because, as explained below, the fact that we may have 
immediate jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a permitting 
decision does not mean that the agency charged with 
administering the permitting process is thereby divested of its 
authority to review challenges to its permits via its established 
administrative procedures. 
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based on that misunderstanding was unreasonable and so 
cannot stand. 
 
The NJDEP and Transco urge that jurisdiction properly 
lies in this Court because the permit decision was final and 
because requiring exhaustion of state remedies would run 
counter to the NGA’s purpose of streamlining natural gas 
permits.  This may be so.  However, the determination of 
whether we may assert jurisdiction immediately upon a 
permitting decision does not answer whether the agency is 
simultaneously stripped of jurisdiction to provide an 
administrative adjudicatory hearing in the ordinary 
course.  Our limitation to considering only final orders, see 
Delaware III, slip op. at 10, is a constraint on our own 
jurisdiction, not a determination that we are the only forum 
available to consider final orders.25  Indeed, if the NJDEP and 
                                              
25 In other words, our own limitation to hearing only 
final orders is not necessarily tantamount to creating an 
exhaustion requirement in the state process.  See, e.g., 
Delaware III, slip op. at 17 (“[F]inality is ‘conceptually 
distinct’ from the related issue of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.” (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n 
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 192 (1985))); 
Berkshire, 851 F.3d at 110 (explaining that “[f]inding that a 
statute requires final agency action is different from finding 
that it requires exhaustion” (citing Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 
137, 144 (1993))).  Assuming that a state considers an order 
final even though additional state agency procedures may be 
available — and that the classification is consistent with 
federal finality standards — we may consider a judicial 
challenge to the order despite the petitioner’s failure to exhaust 
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Transco are correct that the NJDEP orders at issue here were 
final when issued, see Transco Br. 24; NJDEP Br. 10, 12, New 
Jersey clearly provides for a 30-day window to seek an 
adjudicatory hearing to contest that final order.  We therefore 
do not necessarily disagree with the NJDEP and Transco’s 
assertion that the petitioners could have immediately appealed 
the NJDEP’s orders to this Court.  Nor do we disagree that, 
assuming the petitioners sought immediately to bring such a 
civil action — and again putting aside the question of finality 
— this Court would be the only judicial body to which such a 
challenge could be brought.  Our holding is only that (1) 
instead of bringing a civil action in this Court, the petitioners 
were entitled under New Jersey law to have alternatively first 
sought an intra-agency adjudicative hearing, and (2) the 
NJDEP violated New Jersey law by unreasonably denying the 
petitioners’ request for such a hearing based on its misreading 
of the NGA and this Court’s precedent. 
 
In sum, although the plain language of the NGA strips 
state courts — as well as federal district courts — of 
jurisdiction to hear civil actions challenging an administrative 
agency’s permitting decision regarding interstate natural gas 
pipelines, it does not purport to meddle with the inner workings 
of the agency’s approval process or to insert federal appellate 
                                              
those further state administrative remedies.  See Delaware III, 
slip op. at 12–13, 17.  And conversely, even though a petitioner 
might have the right immediately to commence a civil action 
in this Court, this does not necessarily extinguish his or her 
right instead to seek redress via the available administrative 
avenues before filing that civil action.  
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courts arbitrarily into the state administrative scheme.  The 
language of the statute merely requires that judicial challenges 
to the outcome of the administrative process come straight to 
us.  If, however, a state allows for an internal administrative 
review of a permitting process, such a process does not 
contravene the NGA.  Because the NJDEP denied the 
petitioners’ request for an adjudicatory hearing based on its 
belief to the contrary, we will remand to the agency with 
instructions to reconsider the petitioners’ request for a hearing 
in light of our clarification.  In doing so, we express no opinion 
on the petitioners’ ultimate entitlement to an adjudicatory 
hearing based on New Jersey law. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing, we will deny in part and grant 
in part the petitions for review, and remand to the NJDEP for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
